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1 Introduction
There are many recent examples of cases where firms allow consumers to pay
to remove advertisements from an otherwise ad-based product. For example,
Slashdot.org allows users to pay $5 for 1000 ad-free pages. Gamespot.com
offer a monthly subscription for $3.33 that (among some other benefits)
removes advertisements1. The Walt Disney Company offers TV series for
purchase through the iTunes store for $1,99 per episode. A free alternative
with advertisements is available on their homepage or through watching the
show on TV.2 We7 offers music downloads with 10 second ads attached for
free or for a fee without ads.3 There are also companies such as Ultramercial
that allow consumers to “ pay” for premium content on websites by watching
a series of interactive advertisements.4
These examples highlight a strategy where media providers and software
companies practice second-degree price discrimination by offering two ver-
sions differing in advertising quantity. The strategy is easy to follow for
online media firms, since advertisements are easily separable from content.
Technologies such as streaming video over the Internet are also making it
easier to charge consumers for an ad-free version of television shows.
The increasing use of this practice raises questions about its impact on
advertising quantity and the distribution of surplus among the agents in-
volved. The provision of programming and advertising in the broadcasting
industry has been subject to a considerable degree of attention from regu-
lators. For example, advertising quantity is regulated in several European
countries. As an increasing amount of advertising expenditures move online,
the implications of newly available strategies such as charging consumers for
the removal of advertisements may become important in policy discussions.5
1Slashdot.org (2007) and Gamespot.com (2007)
2Bossman (2006). Some cable television companies also offer subscription services
for digital video recorders, that can be set to automatically remove advertisements from
recorded shows.
3We7.com (2007)
4Ultramercial.com (2007). Ultramercial offers a gallery of over 400 reviews of previous
successful campaigns (one example is the online version of The Economist, which some-
times can be fully accessed if the visitor clicks through a sequence of ads or watches a
short video).
5According to ZenithOptimedia, the total amount spent globally on Internet advertis-
ing will exceed advertising expenditures on radio in 2008. Further, the rate of spending
is predicted to increase six times faster than spending on traditional media between 2006
and 2009 (Ilett, 2007).
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The goal of this paper is two-fold. I first seek to understand when allow-
ing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is optimal for a monopolist
media firm. I then seek to analyze how advertising quantity and the dis-
tribution of surplus is affected by shifting from a business model of being
entirely ad-based to a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove
advertisements. To this end, I construct a model of a two-sided vertically
differentiated market. A monopolist media firm may mediate advertise-
ments between advertisers and consumers by attaching them to an already
developed product of given quality. Consumers are heterogeneous over their
valuation for quality and they perceive advertisements as reducing the qual-
ity of the product. Advertisers are monopoly producers of new goods and
they are heterogeneous over the purchase probability of their goods. The
media firm has three possible business models that can be implemented. The
media firm can be purely fee-based, purely ad-based or have an ad-based
version but allow consumers to pay to remove the ads.
I show the following. A business model of allowing consumers to pay
to remove advertisements is more likely to be optimal when the quality of
the media firm’s product is low, the annoyance of advertisements is high,
and advertisers’ profit margins are low. Further, the media firm may benefit
from an increase in the annoyance of advertisements. Advertising quantity is
higher when consumers can pay to remove advertisements compared to when
they can’t and advertising quantity may be increasing in the annoyance of
advertisements (this offers a testable implication of the model). Shifting to
a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements
harms consumers but benefits advertisers and the media firm. The impact
on total welfare is ambiguous.
Essentially, the idea is that the media firm must balance revenues from
consumers and revenues from advertisers. Revenues from advertisers are
tied to advertisers’ profit margins and the number of consumers viewing
ads. Hence, when consumers are highly profitable to advertisers the media
firm is better of not allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements
as it would decrease the number of consumers that view ads. Conversely
if the quality of the media firm’s product were relatively high, introducing
a free ad-based product would only cannibalize sales from the fee-based
alternative. Being purely fee-based is optimal in this case. For cases where
advertisers’ profit margins and the quality of the media firm’s product is
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low in relation to the annoyance of ads it may be that the cannibalization
effect is sufficiently low. Then, having a free ad-based version and allowing
consumers to pay to remove advertisements is optimal.
In this case, profits are increasing in the annoyance of ads since the
cannibalization effect from the free version is reduced and higher prices
can be charged for the removal of ads. Further, advertising quantity is
higher than under a purely ad-based business model. This is since a higher
price can be charged for removing advertisements if the ad-based version
has more ads. Advertising quantity is also increasing in the annoyance
of ads, since the marginal impact of an increase in advertising quantity
on utility is higher when the annoyance advertising is higher. Consumer
welfare is reduced compared to offering only an ad-based version even though
consumers have more options. Consumers using the ad-based version view
more ads. Consumers paying to remove them pay a higher price than the
disutility ads would have cost them had the media firm been purely ad-based.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related lit-
erature. Section 3 describes the setup of the model. I solve for optimal prices
under 3 different business models (fee-based, ad-based and paying to remove
advertisements) and compare under what condition each business model is
optimal in section 4. Section 5 compares the change in advertising quantity
and in the distribution of surplus when the media firm moves from being
purely ad-based to allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements.
The final section concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on price discrimination in media mar-
kets. Previous analyses in the media market literature have focused on wel-
fare issues related to pay-per-view versus free airing of outstanding events
(such as boxing matches). Price discrimination is an issue since the media
firm can require consumers to pay to watch the event live, and then air it
for free a day later. This is the setup in Holden (1993), who concludes that
consumers are harmed by the possibility of pay-per-view. Hansen and Kyhl
(2001) consider a slightly different setup in which the pay-per-view version
contains advertisements and a free version is not available. They analyze
how a ban on pay-per-view affects welfare. They find that consumer welfare
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is enhanced by a ban, but that the overall impact on welfare is ambiguous.
A recent addition to the literature is by Anderson and Gans (2007), who
examine the impact on broadcaster behavior when consumers adopt adver-
tising avoidance technologies. They show that advertising quantity could
increase, as the remaining consumers are less averse to advertising. As a re-
sult, overall welfare and program quantity could decrease and programming
would be tailored to appeal to a broader range of viewers.
Price discrimination in media markets has also attracted some attention
in the marketing literature. Prasad, Mahajan, and Bronnenberg (2003) ana-
lyze incentives to price discriminate when consumers are of two given types
and a media firm may offer two versions differing in advertising quantity
and price. They show that offering two versions (price discrimination) tend
to be optimal in most cases.
For the cases I have in mind, the media firms typically provide one
free ad-based version and one fee-based version. The versions are similar,
so consumers essentially pay to remove the advertisements. The effects on
pricing and surplus distribution of offering consumers the opportunity to pay
to remove all advertisements have not so far been explored in the literature.
An analysis of this case is important, since the provision of the option to
pay to remove advertisements is likely to affect advertising quantity and the
distribution of surplus among agents. Holden (1993) does consider this type
of setup, but he only examines the impact on consumer surplus. Further,
consumers are homogeneous in terms of the impact of advertising on utility
in his model. Consumers with heterogeneous aversion to advertising appear
in Anderson and Gans (2007) and in Prasad et al. (2003). Anderson and
Gans (2007) do not however consider the simultaneous determination of
price for a fee-based version and price for advertising space. They mainly
focus on the case where advertising avoidance technologies are acquired from
other suppliers than the broadcaster.
In spirit, the analysis of Prasad et al. (2003) is perhaps closest to the
analysis in this paper. In their paper advertising affects the perceived qual-
ity of the media firm’s product negatively. However, Prasad et al. (2003)
consider only two types of consumers while I model consumer types as con-
tinuously distributed on an interval. This allows for a closer connection
between the consumer and the advertiser side of the market. An ad-free
version is also not available in Prasad et al. (2003). Both versions contain
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Figure 1: Relationships between advertisers, the media firm and consumers.
advertisements. Further, they do not provide a welfare analysis. I also incor-
porate a parameter in my model measuring the extent to which advertising
impacts the perceived quality of the media firm’s product (the annoyance of
ads). The parameter becomes an important determinant of the optimality
of offering consumers both an ad-based and a fee-based version. It deter-
mines the extent to which the free ad-based version cannibalizes sales of the
fee-based version.
3 The Model
Having described the relation to the literature in the previous section, this
section describes the setup of the model. It is a model of a two-sided ver-
tically differentiated market.6 A monopolist media firm has a product of
given quality to which advertisements can be attached. Consumers are het-
erogeneous over their valuation for quality and they perceive advertisements
as reducing the quality of the product. Advertisers are monopoly producers
of new goods and they are heterogeneous over the purchase probability of
6The model is quite closely related to models that appear in Katsamankas and Bakos
(2004) and Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004). However, I consider negative externalities
in one direction and incorporate a form of price discrimination towards one side of the
market.
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their goods. The relationship between the media firm, consumers and ad-
vertisers are outlined in figure 1. I now describe in detail the media firm,
the consumers and the advertisers.
3.1 The Media Firm
Consider a monopolist media firm that has developed a good of intrinsic
quality level v.7 The fixed costs related to the development of this product
are sunk and duplication carries small or zero costs. The media firm inter-
acts with consumers and advertisers and can choose between three business
models.
• Fee-based: The media firm could sell the product at price pc to con-
sumers and not have any ads.
• Ad-based: The media firm could offer the product for free to consumers
and sell ad-space to advertisers for the price pa.
• Paying to remove advertisements: The media firm could offer both the
product without ads for a price pc and the product with ads for free
and sell ad-space for pa.
The media firm chooses the business model that offers the highest prof-
its. The ad-based version is explicitly constrained to carry a zero price.
This specification is important and motivated by the examples in the intro-
duction, where firms are observed to specifically offer consumers otherwise
enjoying a free ad-based version the option to pay to remove all advertise-
ments.8
3.2 Consumers
I consider a continuum of consumers of mass N with unit demand. Con-
sumers dislike ads and perceive a good with ads as a good of inferior quality.
For the markets I have in mind, it seems to be reasonable to assume that
consumers dislike ads. First, consumers are observed to be willing to pay
7The media firm can be a broadcaster, a magazine, a software firm, a website or any
other kind of firm that can embed advertisements in its product.
8A fourth possible business model would be to consider a fee-based version with ads.
I do not consider this alternative since I want to focus on the specific case of either a
fee-based version or an ad-based version.
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to remove advertisements so they clearly reveal a preference for consuming
the product without ads. Second, there is casual evidence that advertising
is not desirable. For example, according to Ehomeupgrade.com (2007), a
report issued by DIGDIA (www.digdia.com) showed that 44% of consumers
would prefer to watch a movie on TV without ads and paying $3,99, while
only 17% would pay $2,99 and watch the content on TV with ads. The other
options where buying a DVD (27%), downloading the movie and watching
it on the computer for $3,99 (9%) and watching the movie on the computer
with ads for $2,99 (3%). As Ehomeupgrade.com (2007) puts it: “Over 250%
more people would rather pay an extra dollar just to avoid ads with their
movie”.
I hence assume that consumers dislike advertisements.9 Specifically, con-
sumers perceive a good with advertisements to be of quality q = v − γa.
The variable a denotes advertisement quantity and γ measures the impact
of advertising on quality. It is interpreted as the general annoyance level of
advertisements. I want to focus on the case where quality is positive so I
set a to be equal to the share of advertisers that choose to advertise and I
assume that γ ∈ [0, v].
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their marginal valuation of
quality denoted by θ. The distribution of θ is uniform on the unit interval.
Hence, a consumer indexed by i gets utility
ui =


θiv − pc if using the fee-based version (removing ads)
θi(v − γa) if using the ad-based version
0 otherwise
, (1)
where pc is the price consumers pay to remove advertisements (or simply
the price for the product if the free version is not available). Hence, the
“cost” of the media firm’s product to consumers is either the price pc or the
individual disutility θiγa incurred due to ads being present. The fraction
of consumers adopting the fee-based version of the product is given by m
while the fraction adopting the free ad-based version is given by n.
The specific dependence of quality on advertising used here allows con-
sumers to be heterogeneous both in terms of intrinsic product quality and
9This is in line with Holden (1993), Hansen and Kyhl (2001), Prasad et al. (2003) and
Anderson and Gans (2007).
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over the impact of advertising on their utility.10 This is consistent with
the interpretation that advertisements degrade the perceived quality of the
product. It seems reasonable to assume that consumers who value qual-
ity more also dislike advertisements more. First, in many cases advertising
takes up space, which reduces the amount of content. The reduction of
content is more important for consumers who value content highly. Second,
advertising requires attention from consumers. Consumers who value qual-
ity highly might have a higher opportunity cost of time and hence dislike
advertisements more.
3.3 Advertisers
The advertisers, a mass of 1, are monopoly producers of new goods.11 Adver-
tising fills the role of informing consumers about prices and characteristics
of their goods.12 Each advertiser has developed a new good characterized
by its type σ uniformly distributed on the unit interval. The type of the
good indicates its purchase probability after being advertised. Goods of
higher type are more likely to be bought after being advertised. I assume
that the profit margin on the goods sold by the advertisers is equal to s.
Hence, an advertiser j is willing to pay a maximum price of σjsnN to place
an advertisement in the media firm’s product. The advertiser j profits from
advertising according to
pij =


σjsnN − pa if advertising
0 otherwise
. (2)
To simplify, I assume that consumers gain no utility from purchasing
goods from advertisers. Hence, all informational benefits from advertising
are captured by the advertisers. A possible extension would be to consider
the case where the profit margins of the advertisers are dependent on con-
10A heterogeneous impact of advertising on utility is an important difference between
my model and the analyses in Holden (1993) and Hansen and Kyhl (2001). Heterogeneous
aversion to advertising is a part of the analysis in Prasad et al. (2003), but they do not
consider to what extent advertisements impact utility. Essentially the assumption is that
γ = 1. They also consider only two consumer types (θH and θL).
11So N > 1 implies that there are relatively more consumers than advertisers.
12Note that I refer to the good sold and produced by the media firm as the product.
The goods advertisers produce and sell are referred to as goods. For a discussion of the
different roles of advertising see for example Bagwell (2005).
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sumers’ valuation of quality, θ. Relaxing this assumption would imply at
least two things.
First, a formal model of how advertisers price their goods would be
needed. Their pricing decision would be dependent on how many consumers
use the ad-based version the media firm offers and hence on the price for
removing advertisements.13 Second, consumers would be left with some sur-
plus from purchasing advertisers’ goods and hence have to balance the disu-
tility from having advertisements with possible gains from being informed
about a useful product that generates utility. These are important aspects
to account for, but unfortunately they are not a straightforward extension
of this model and are left for future research.
To summarize, I construct a model of a two-sided vertically differenti-
ated market in which a media firm may mediate advertisements between
advertisers and consumers. Consumers are heterogeneous over their valu-
ation for quality and they perceive advertisements as reducing the quality
of the product. Advertisers are monopoly producers of new goods and they
are heterogeneous over the purchase probability of their goods. The media
firm has three possible business models that can be implemented. Either the
media firm is purely fee-based, purely ad-based or the firm allows consumers
to pay to remove advertisements.
4 Solving the Model
Having described the setup of the model, I now solve for optimal prices
under the three different business models the media firm can adopt. I then
compare profit levels to check when each business model is optimal. Solving
the model shows that a business model of allowing consumers to pay to
remove advertisements is more likely to be optimal when the quality of the
media firm’s product is low, the annoyance of advertisements is high, and
advertisers’ profit margins are low. Further, the media firm may have an
incentive to increase the annoyance of advertisements.
13Alternatively, only the profit margin could be dependent on θ and the pricing problem
could be bypassed. This is the case in Prasad et al. (2003).
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4.1 Fee-based
Consider the business model where the media firm is entirely fee-based and
offers no ad-based product. Let the consumer indifferent between buying
the fee-based product and not buying be of type θc. Then consumers of
type θ ∈ [θc, 1] buy the product. The location of θc is given by
θcv − pc = 0. (3)
Demand for the fee-based product is Nm(pc) = N(1 −
pc
v
) for pc ∈ [0, v],
Nm(pc) = 0 for pc > v and Nm(pc) = N otherwise. The media firm’s profit
function is
ΠF (pc) = pcNm(pc) (4)
The media firm chooses price to maximize profits.
Proposition 1: When the media firm is fee-based, the price for the product
is v2 and profits are ΠF = N
v
4 .
Proof. See the appendix.
When the media firm is fee-based, a higher quality product implies higher
profits. An increase in the number of consumers has the same effect. Op-
timal prices and profits do not depend on characteristics on the advertiser
side of the market.
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to quality. Hence, one might
ask whether the media firm would find it optimal to price discriminate by
offering two versions of the good, vH and vL, such that vH > vL. It can be
shown that this kind of price discrimination is not optimal. The reason is
that marginal costs are zero and are not affected by the quality level. Hence,
there is no reduction in marginal costs when quality is reduced. It is then
optimal to offer only one version (with the current utility specification).14
4.2 Ad-based
I now consider the business model where the firm is entirely ad-based. Con-
sumers can not pay to remove advertisements. Let the advertiser indifferent
between advertising and not advertising own the good of type σa. Then
14See for example Bhargava and Choudhary (2001)
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advertisers with goods of type σ ∈ [σa, 1] will advertise. Total advertising
quantity is a = (1− σa). The location of σa will be given by
σasN − pa = 0. (5)
Notice that all consumers watch the ads (n = 1). This is since the media
firm’s product is free when the media firm is entirely ad-based and quality
is always non-negative (v − γa ≥ 0). Demand for ad-space can then be
expressed as a(pa) = (1 −
pa
sN
) for pa ∈ [0, Ns], a(pa) = 0 for pa > Ns and
by a(pa) = 1 otherwise. The media firm’s profit function is given by
ΠA(pa) = paa(pa). (6)
The firm chooses price for ad-space so as to maximize profits.
Proposition 2: When the media firm is ad-based, optimal price for ad-
space is sN2 and profits are ΠA =
sN
4 . Advertising quantity is
1
2 .
Proof. See the appendix.
When the firm is ad-based, all consumers use the product and view the
ads. The media firm can charge more for ad-space if advertisers’ profit
margins (s) are higher or if there are more consumers (N) in the market
viewing the advertisements. Notice that the level of annoyance of advertise-
ments (γ) is of no importance to the media firm since profits are not earned
from consumers and the annoyance is assumed to be low enough so that no
consumers stop using the media firm’s product.
4.3 Paying to Remove Advertisements
In this subsection I consider paying to remove advertisements. Both the fee-
based and the ad-based version are hence available. Consumers not choosing
the ad-based version adopt the fee-based version (pay to remove ads). I first
characterize demand formation and then solve for optimal prices, profits and
advertising quantity. I consider only interior solutions where demand for the
fee-based product and demand for ad-space is positive.
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Figure 2: Demand structure facing the media firm when consumers can pay
to remove advertisements.
4.3.1 Demand Formation
Consumers. Let θc denote the consumer indifferent between paying to re-
move advertisements and using the ad-based version for free. Given prices,
it must then be that consumers with θ ∈ [θc, 1] pay while consumers with
θ ∈ [0, θc] use the free version. Using equation (1), the location of the
indifferent consumer can be obtained from the indifference equation
θcv − pf = θcv − θcγa (7)
for θc. This gives θc =
pc
γa
. Demand for the ad-based version is then given
by Nn(pc, a) = N(
pc
γa
) for pc ∈ [0, γa], by N for pc > γa and by 0 otherwise.
Demand for the fee-based version is Nm(pc, a) = N [1 − n(pc, a)]. All con-
sumers acquire the media firm’s product, but only the fraction n view the
ads.
Advertisers. Let the advertiser indifferent between advertising and not
advertising own the good of type σa. Advertisers with goods of type σ ∈
[σa, 1] advertise and the location of σa is given by the indifference equation
σasnN − pa = 0. (8)
Demand for ad-space is then a(pa, n) = (1 −
pa
snN
) for pa ∈ [0, snN ], 0 for
pa > snN and 1 otherwise. Demand is illustrated in figure 2.
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To account for the fact that demand for ad-space depends on demand for
the ad-based version and vice versa, I assume that consumers form rational
expectations regarding the participation of advertisers and that advertisers
form rational expectations regarding the participation of users (see Katz
and Shapiro (1985)).15 Rational expectations on behalf of the advertisers
and the consumers require that the following system of equations be solved
in order to obtain demand as functions of price on both sides of the market:
n(pc, a) = n = (
pc
γa
) (9)
a(pa, n) = a = (1−
pa
snN
) (10)
This system has the solutions n(pc, pa) =
pa
sN
+ pc
γ
and a(pc, pa) =
sNpc
sNpc+paγ
.
They give the share of consumers viewing the advertisements and demand
for ad-space as functions of the price to remove advertisements and the price
for ad-space. Demand for the ad-based version is Nn(pc, pa) and demand
for the fee-based version is N [m(pc, pa)].
4.3.2 Pricing
The media firm sets price for the fee-based version and price for ad-space to
maximize
ΠF+A = N [m(pc, pa)]pc + a(pc, pa)pa (11)
subject to the constraints that 0 ≤ pa ≤ sNn(pc, pa) and 0 ≤ pc ≤ γa(pc, pa).
I consider only interior solutions where no constraints bind. The solution to
this maximization problem yields proposition 3.
Proposition 3: When the media firm offers both an ad-based and a fee-
based version of its product, optimal advertising quantity is 13 +
γ
3s ,
price for ad-space is pa = N
1
9(s +
2s
γ
− γ), price for the fee-based
version is pc =
(s+γ)2
9s and profits are ΠF+A = N
(s+γ)2(2γ−s)
27sγ . Profits
from consumers are increasing in γ and decreasing in s. Profits from
advertisers are decreasing in γ and increasing in s.
15This problem do not arise in Holden (1993) or Hansen and Kyhl (2001) since the media
firm directly sets advertising quantity resulting in some level of ad-revenue. Consumers
observe this level of advertising before their purchase. Advertisers have no choice of
advertising or not and hence how they value consumers is not specifically modelled. The
choice is present in Prasad et al. (2003), but they neither face this problem since there are
only two consumer types in their model.
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Proof. See the appendix.
The proposition shows that the price for removing advertisements, the
price for ad-space and total profits of the media firm depend on character-
istics on both sides of the market. The optimal source of revenues for the
media firm depends on the relation between γ and s, since this determines
the ability to extract revenue from consumers relative to the ability to ex-
tract revenue from advertisers. By setting price for removing advertisements
and price for ad-space the media firm can determine what share of consumers
view ads and what share pays to remove them. A higher annoyance of ads
implies that more can be charged for removing them, hence consumers be-
come a more important source of revenues relative to advertisers. If the
profit margins of advertisers increase this implies that they are willing to
pay more for reaching each consumer. Consumers then become relatively
more important as viewers of ads compared to being paying consumers, and
hence revenues from advertisers increase in relative importance.
Overall profits are increasing in both γ and s. That overall profits in-
crease in s is perhaps intuitive, since there is “more surplus to be shared”.
However, that overall profits increase in γ is perhaps less intuitive. They
increase in γ because if advertisements are more annoying this implies that
price for removing advertisements can be increased. At optimum, the profit
gains from consumers outweigh the losses in profits from advertisers (due to
less consumers viewing advertisements).
The fact that the profit is increasing in γ implies that the media firm
would have incentives to increase the general level of annoyance of ads. As
will be shown below, a higher γ (when allowing consumers to pay to remove
advertisements is optimal) increases advertiser surplus. This is because opti-
mal ad-price is decreasing in γ. Hence, advertisers may not object to actions
by the media firm that make advertisements more annoying. They may even
contribute in the design of their advertisements.
A final point to note is the following. Providing two versions differing in
quality (fee-based and ad-based) is essentially second-degree price discrim-
ination. As was discussed above, price discrimination by simply providing
two versions differing in their inherent quality is not optimal in this model
since there are no savings in terms of marginal costs from providing a lower
quality version. However, price discrimination by degrading quality with
advertisements may be optimal. This is because profits from selling adver-
14
tising space acts as a negative marginal cost. A lower quality version allows
more ad-space to be sold. Compared to providing only a fee-based version,
profits from consumers actually decrease when two versions differing in per-
ceived quality are offered. The profit loss is however compensated by gains
from selling ad-space.16
4.4 Comparing Business Models
By comparisons of profit levels from propositions 1, 2 and 3 the following
proposition can be obtained.
Proposition 4: For s
γ
∈ [0, 12 ], only a fee-based version is optimal. For
s
γ
∈]12 , 2[ and v < v
∗ a fee-based version and an ad-based version should
be made available so consumers can pay to remove advertisements. If
s
γ
∈]12 , 2[ and v ≥ v
∗ only a fee-based version is optimal. For s
γ
∈ [2,∞[
and v < v∗∗the media firm should be purely ad-based. If s
γ
∈ [2,∞[
and v ≥ v∗∗ then only a fee-based version is optimal.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition behind proposition 4 is the following. When ad-space is
sold, the media firm has two possible sources of revenues. It can either
charge consumers for a fee-based version, or charge advertisers for access to
consumers. Consumers’ willingness to pay for a fee-based version is related
to the annoyance of advertisements (γ). Advertisers willingness to pay for
ad-space is related to their profit level(s). Hence, the relation between the
two variables determine on what source of revenues the media firm should
focus. However, it may be that simply selling the product to consumers and
not involving advertisers is optimal. This is the case if product quality (v)
is sufficiently high so that offering a free ad-based version is suboptimal due
to concerns about cannibalization of sales of the fee-based version.
To summarize, solving the model showed that allowing consumers to
pay to remove advertisements is optimal if the ratio s
γ
is in an intermediate
range and v is sufficiently low. This implies that a business model of allowing
consumers to pay to remove advertisements is more likely to be optimal when
16There is a slight difference in that the lower quality version has no price in this model
and that no consumers drop out of the market when two versions are offered. However,
the intuition on why offering two versions may be optimal still holds.
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the quality of the media firm’s product is low, the impact of advertising on
quality is high, and advertisers’ profit margins are low.
5 Advertising Quantity and Surplus Distribution
Having outlined optimal prices under the different business models and com-
pared them I now move over to analyze the implications on advertising quan-
tity and the surplus distribution of a shift from being ad-based to allowing
consumers to pay to remove advertisements. I first analyze the difference
in advertising quantity, then consider the difference in the surplus distribu-
tion. I show that advertising quantity is higher when consumers can pay to
remove advertisements compared to when they can’t. This yields a testable
implication of my model. Further, advertising quantity may be increasing
in the annoyance of advertisements. Shifting to a business model of allowing
consumers to pay to remove advertisements harms consumers but benefits
advertisers and the media firm. The impact on total welfare is ambiguous.
5.1 Advertising Quantity
Proposition 5: Suppose allowing consumers to pay to remove advertise-
ments is optimal. Then advertising quantity
(i) is increasing in the annoyance of ads.
(ii) is higher than when the media firm is purely ad-based.
Proof. Follows by straightforward comparison of advertising quantity in
proposition 2 and 3 and by inspection of advertising quantity in proposition
3.
The first result of proposition 5 may be surprising. Intuitively, one might
think that if advertisements generate more disutility through their impact
on quality, advertising quantity should be decreased. However, a higher
impact on utility is desirable for the media firm since this decreases the
value of the ad-based version. Further, it increases the marginal impact
of advertising quantity on quality. This implies that optimal advertising
quantity should be increased by decreasing price for ad-space. Hence, as γ
increases advertising quantity increases.
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The second result that advertising quantity is higher under paying to
remove advertisements compared to the business model where the media
firm is ad-based is due to the fact that the media firm has incentives to make
paying to remove advertisements as attractive as possible to consumers. This
can be done by lowering price for removing advertisements or by decreasing
price for advertising space (thereby increasing advertisement quantity). At
optimum, doing both is optimal so advertising quantity increases as price
for ad-space falls.
This result yields a testable implication of the model. When firms allow
consumers to pay to remove advertisements, advertisement quantity should
be higher than when the option is not available (or the existing ads should
be more annoying). There seems to be some anecdotal evidence of this
result. When traffic to slashdot.org increased, the option to pay to get rid of
advertisements was introduced (Slashdot.org, 2007). As Prasad et al. (2003)
mentions, Slashdot.org increased the number of advertisements displayed in
connection with introducing the option. The same seems to be true for
Gamespot.com. Compared to other sites that CNET Networks operate,
Gamespot.com seems to have the most advertisements. It is one of two sites
in their portfolio that allow consumers to pay to get rid of the advertisements
(Gamespot.com, 2007).
5.2 The Distribution of Surplus
In this subsection I compare the change in the distribution of surplus among
advertisers, the media firm and consumers. Specifically, I am interested
in considering the implications on the surplus distribution of a shift from
being ad-based to allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements. As
emphasized in the introduction, newly available technologies are making it
easier for traditionally ad-based firms to charge consumers for a fee-based
version of their product. There also seems to have been an increase in
the practice of offering software services in ad-based versions (usually to
consumers) and in paid versions (usually to corporations). This may party
be due to the increasing presence of Internet based software. By comparing
the distribution of surplus across the different ranges in my model I am able
to analyze how these new technologies may impact consumer, advertiser and
producer surplus.
Given optimal prices, consumer surplus can be split into the surplus to
17
consumers consuming the fee-based version and to consumers consuming the
ad-based version:
CSF (θc, pc) =
∫ 1
θc
θv − pcdθ (12)
CSA(θc, pc, a) =
∫ θc
0
θ(v − γa)dθ (13)
while surplus left to advertisers can be denoted
AS(σa, pa, n) =
∫ 1
σa
σsnN − padσ (14)
Total surplus is defined as TS = CSF +CSA+AS+Π. In order to focus on
the shift to allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements I assume
that v is sufficiently low so that shifting to a fully fee-based business model
is not optimal. By substituting optimal parameter values from propositions
2 and 3 and comparing surpluses, the following proposition can be shown.
Proposition 6: A shift from being ad-based to allowing consumers to pay
to remove advertisements results in higher profits for the media firm,
greater surplus to advertisers and a decrease in consumer surplus. The
impact on total surplus is ambiguous.
Proof. See the appendix.
Consider the change in surplus distribution when paying to remove ad-
vertisements is introduced. The media firm obviously benefits, otherwise it
could remain purely ad-based. Perhaps surprisingly, consumers are worse
off when they have the option to pay to remove advertisements. Consumers
who choose to pay to remove advertisements are worse off because the price
they are forced to pay causes more disutility than advertising did when the
firm was ad-based. They are still willing to pay though, since when the
option to pay to remove advertisements is available advertising quantity in
the ad-based version is increased. Since ad-quantity is increased, consumers
using the free version when both options are available are also worse off.
These consumers now have to put up with a higher amount of advertise-
ments than under the purely ad-based business model. Finally, a higher
amount of advertising implies that price for ad-space must decrease causing
advertisers to benefit.
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The impact on total welfare depends on the relative size of gains to the
media firm and advertisers versus the losses in consumer surplus. Advertiser
surplus play a key role here because it captures some of the benefits of
informational advertising. It is however not high enough to compensate for
losses in consumer surplus for all parameter ranges. Naturally there is a
question about which measure of total welfare matters. If total welfare is
measured as the sum of consumer, media firm and advertiser surplus then
the overall implication is ambiguous. However, if consumer surplus is the
relevant measure for total welfare then welfare unambiguously decreases.17
To summarize, this section showed that advertising quantity is higher
when consumers can pay to remove advertisements compared to when they
can’t. Further, advertising quantity may be increasing in the annoyance of
advertisements. Shifting to a business model of allowing consumers to pay
to remove advertisements harms consumers but benefits advertisers and the
media firm. The impact on total welfare is ambiguous.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have showed that a business model of allowing consumers to
pay to remove advertisements is more likely to be optimal when the quality
of the media firm’s product is low, the annoyance of advertisements is high,
and advertisers’ profit margins are low. Further, the media firm may benefit
from an increase in the annoyance of advertisements. Advertising quantity is
higher when consumers can pay to remove advertisements compared to when
they can’t and advertising quantity may be increasing in the annoyance of
advertisements (this offers a testable implication of the model). Shifting to
a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements
harms consumers but benefits advertisers and the media firm. The impact
on total welfare is ambiguous.
Understanding what impact price discrimination may have on adver-
tising quantity and the distribution of surplus may be of importance in
discussions related to policy issues. An increasing percentage of advertising
budgets are spent on advertising online and new technologies that permit
consumers to pay to remove advertisements are emerging. Hence, the results
17The result that consumers are harmed and that the impact on overall welfare is
ambiguous is in line with the analyses of Holden (1993) and Hansen and Kyhl (2001).
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of this analysis may be of interest to policy makers.
In terms of further research, generalizing the model by introducing com-
petition among media firms is an obvious next step.18 Further possible
extensions would be to incorporate advertisers that care about which type
of consumers they reach and/or to allow consumers to receive informational
benefits from viewing advertisements. Finally, a testable implication of the
model is that advertising quantity should be higher when the option of pay-
ing to remove advertisements is available to consumers. Empirically testing
this implication might be interesting.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The first order condition is given by N(1 − 2pc
v
) = 0 which gives pc =
v
2 .
The second order condition is satisfied since −N 2
v
< 0. Substituting pc =
v
2
in ΠF (pc) gives ΠF = N
v
4 .

Proof of Proposition 2
The first order condition is given by 1− 2pa
sN
= 0 which gives pa =
sN
2 . The
second order condition is satisfied since − 2
sN
< 0. Substituting pa =
sN
2 in
a(pa) and in ΠA(pa) gives a =
1
2 and ΠA =
Ns
4 .

Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that the solution is interior so that none of the constraints are bind-
ing. Taking the first order conditions and solving the resulting simultaneous
equation system yield two solutions for {pc, pa} given by {
(s+γ)2
9s ,
1
9N(s−γ+
2s2
γ
)} and {0, N s(s+γ)
γ
}. The determinants of the principal minors evaluated
at each solution point are {23N(
9
s+γ −
1
s
− 7
γ
), 3
s2
} and {2N( 1
s+γ −
2
γ
),− 1
s2
}.
They should alternate in sign such that the first is non-positive and the
second is non-negative for the solution to be a maximum. Since − 1
s2
< 0,
the optimum can not be the solution characterized by {0, N s(s+γ)
γ
}. The
second solution satisfies the second order conditions if 23N(
9
s+γ −
1
s
− 7
γ
) < 0.
Denote the candidate solution by stars. Use n(p∗c , p
∗
a) and a(p
∗
c , p
∗
a) to get
expressions for demand in terms of the exogenous variables. This gives
n∗ = s+γ3γ and a
∗ = s+γ3s . It is now apparent that the solution is an inte-
rior optimum only if s
γ
∈]12 , 2[, since otherwise the prices are not consistent
with demand configurations in the range Nn ∈ [0, N ] and a ∈ [0, 1]. Since
2
3N(
9
s+γ −
1
γ
− 7
γ
) < 0 for this range the candidate solution is the optimum.
At the boundary where s
γ
= 2, pc = 0 and pa =
sN
2 the problem reduces
to the one in section 4.2. At the other boundary s
γ
= 12 , pc =
γ
2 and pa = 0
all advertisers buy ad-space so consumers are indifferent between not using
the fee-based version and taking the outside option. The maximum profit
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the media firm can achieve at this boundary occurs when γ = v. In this
case ΠF = ΠA+F in which case I assume that the media firm prefers to be
purely fee-based. For any γ < v it must be that a business model of being
entirely fee-based is optimal at the boundary.
Profits can be split into profits from consumers and profits from ad-
vertisers. Profits from consumers are given by ΠCA+F = N
(2γ−s)(γ+s)2
27γs and
profits from advertisers are given by ΠAA+F = N
(2s−γ)(γ+s)2
27γs . It is then
the case that
∂ΠC
A+F
∂γ
= N 4γ
3+3γ2s+s3
27γs2
> 0,
∂ΠC
A+F
∂s
= −N 2(γ
3+s3)
27γ2s
< 0,
∂ΠA
A+F
∂γ
= −N 2(γ
3+s3)
27γ2s
< 0 and
∂ΠA
A+F
∂s
= N 4s
3+3γs2+γ3
27γs2
> 0.

Proof of proposition 4
By the proof to proposition 3, ΠF ≥ ΠA+F > ΠA if
s
γ
≤ 12 since γ ≤ v.
This gives the first part of the proposition. If s
γ
∈]12 , 2[ then ΠA+F > ΠA by
proof to proposition 3 but it may be that ΠF ≥ ΠA+F . This is the case for
v ≥ v∗ where v∗ is such that ΠF −ΠA+F = N
v∗
4 −N
(γ+s)2
27γs = 0. This gives
the second part. If s
γ
≥ 2 then ΠA > ΠA+F by the proof to proposition 3
but it may be that ΠF ≥ ΠA. This is the case for v ≥ v
∗∗ where v∗∗is such
that ΠF −ΠA = N
v∗∗
4 −N
s
4 = 0.

Proof of proposition 6
Paying to remove advertisements: Consumer and advertiser surplus if the
media firm allows consumers to pay to remove advertisements is given by:
CSAF+A = N
∫ θ∗c
0
θ(v − a∗)dθ = N
(s− 2γ)(2γ(s + v)2 − 3sv(4γ + s)
54sγ2
(15)
CSFF+A = N
∫ 1
θ∗c
θv − p∗cdθ = N
(γ + s)2(3sv − γ(γ + s))
54sγ2
(16)
ASF+A =
∫ 1
σ∗a
σsNn∗ − p∗adσ = N
(s+ γ)3
54sγ
(17)
where θ∗c =
s+γ
3γ , σ
∗ = 2s−γ3s , a
∗ = 13+
γ
3s , p
∗
c =
(s+γ)
9s and p
∗
a = N
1
9(s+
2s
γ
−γ).
The surplus to these consumers under the ad-based business model, i.e. with
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θ∗c =
s+γ
3γ , σ
∗ = 2s−γ3s , a
∗ = 12 and p
∗
a = N
s
2 , would have been:
CSAA′ = N
∫ θ∗c
0
θ(v − a∗)dθ = N
(g + s)2(2v − γ)
36γ2
(18)
CSFA′ = N
∫ 1
θ∗c
θ(v − a∗)dθ = N
(2γ − s)(4γ + s)(2v − γ)
36γ2
(19)
where the sum of these two is N (2v−γ)4 and total advertiser surplus under
the ad-based business model is ASA = N
s
8 .
Consider the following differences in surplus. Let ∆CSF = CSFF+A −
CSFA′ denote the difference in surplus to consumers who choose to pay to
remove advertisements when this option is available to them. Let ∆CSA =
CSAF+A − CS
A
A′ be the difference in surplus for consumers who still choose
to use the advertising based version when the option to pay to remove ad-
vertisements is available. Denote by ∆AS = ASF+A − ASA the difference
in advertiser surplus and by ∆Π = ΠF+A−ΠA the difference in firm profits.
Let r be the ratio s
γ
. Then the differences in surplus can be expressed as
∆CSF =
(r − 2)3Nγ
108r
(20)
∆CSA =
(r − 2)(1 + r)2Nγ
108r
(21)
∆AS =
(r − 2)2(1 + 4r)Nγ
216r
(22)
∆Π =
(r − 2)2(1 + 4r)Nγ
108r
(23)
The difference in advertiser surplus and firm profits is positive for r ∈]12 , 2[.
The difference in consumer surplus is negative for both consumer segments.
The effect on total welfare is equal to ∆W = ∆AS+∆CSF+∆CSA+∆Π =
1
216rMγ(r − 2)(4 + r(16r − 25)). The effect on total welfare is ambiguous
and depends on sign{4 + r(16r − 25)}.

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